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The Cost of Anchoring on Credit Card Minimum Payments 
About three quarters of credit card accounts attract interest charges. In the US,
credit card debt is $951.7 billion of a total of $2,539.7 billion of consumer credit. In the
UK, credit card debt is £55.1 billion of £174.4 billion of consumer credit. The 2005 US
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act and the 2003 UK Treasury
Select Committee's report require lenders to collect a minimum payment of at least the
interest accrued each month. Thus people are protected from the effects of compounding
interest. But including minimum payment information has an unintended negative effect,
because minimum payments act as psychological anchors.
In anchoring, arbitrary and irrelevant numbers bias people's judgments (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974) and decisions (Ariely, Lowenstein, & Prelec, 2003), even when
participants know that anchors are random or implausible (Chapman & Johnson, 1994).
Meaningful anchors also bias judgments (e.g., Mussweiler & Strack, 2000). If decisions
about credit card repayments are anchored upon minimum payment information then
people will repay less than they otherwise would and incur greater interest charges (Thaler
& Sunstein, 2008, independently made the same suggestion). Consistent with this
hypothesis I find a strong correlation between minimum payment size and actual
repayment size in a survey of credit card payments. A subsequent experiment
demonstrates a causal link. 
Survey
248 UK credit card holders (50% male, 50% female; aged 18-65) reported their
outstanding balance, their most recent repayment, and the size of minimum payment
required. 196 respondents had non-zero balances (mean = £1,284, median = £516). 113
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paid the balance in full. 83 made a smaller payment (mean = 17% of the balance, median =
8%), including 13 who made only the minimum repayment. The proportions making full,
part, and minimum repayments match UK credit card industry statistics quite closely. 165
reported the presence of minimum payment information (mean = 6.4% of the balance,
median = 3.3%). 
Logistic regression finds, unsurprisingly, that smaller balances more likely to be
repaid in full [2(1) = 33.26, p < .0001, prep = 1.000, R2 = .78]. But minimum payment size
does not further predict the probability of making a full repayment [2(1) = 0.00, p =
1.000, prep = .509, change in R2 = .00]. 
For those making partial repayments, there was a significant positive correlation
between the minimum payment and the actual repayment (with both as a fraction of the
overall balance) [Spearman's  = .57, n = 75, p < .0001, prep = 1.000]. The correlation
remains significant when (a) the size of the balance is partialled out [Spearman's  = .42, n
= 75, p = .0002, prep = .995], (b) those who make only the minimum payment are omitted
[Spearman's  = .57, n = 63, p < .0001, prep = 1.000], and (c) those with balances less than
£500 (who may have fixed-sum minimum payments) are omitted [Spearman's  = .48, n =
57, p = .0002, prep = .996]. 
Experiment
To investigate the causality in the link between minimum payment information and
smaller repayments I ran a hypothetical bill payment experiment manipulating the inclusion
of minimum payment information. 
Method
Similar data are collapsed across 97 campus visitors, 215 web page visitors, and
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101 participants recruited by a market research company (54% female, 46% male; aged
18-68). Participants received a mock credit card statement with a balance of £435.76.
They were asked to imagine that the bill had arrived that morning, to consider how much
they could afford to repay, and then to state how much they would repay. Participants saw
either a statement that included a minimum payment of £5.42 or an otherwise identical
statement that omitted this information.
Results
The proportion of people making full repayments was not significantly affected by
including minimum payment information [54.8% without vs. 55.1% with, two-tailed
Fisher's exact p = 1.000, prep = .500, effect size w = .003]. When minimum payment
information was present, the distribution of partial repayments matched the real-world
distribution from the survey. Removing minimum payment information had a dramatic
effect (Figure 1): Mean repayments rose by 70% from £99 (23% of the balance) to £175
(40% of the balance) [Wilcoxon rank p < .0001, prep = 1.000, Cliff's effect size d = .51].
Minimum payment information reduces repayments of all sizes. For example, the peak in
the £200-£250 bin---caused by a preference to make round repayments of £200---is
reduced by minimum payment information. 
Discussion
The survey and experiment provide converging evidence that, although minimum
payment information does not reduce the probability of paying the bill in full, minimum
payment information does reduce the size of partial repayments. Generalizing the survey
to a typical scenario of an average debt of $4,000 and an APR of 20% shows that a 2%
reduction in minimum payments roughly quadruples interest charges: A first quartile
The Cost of Anchoring     5
minimum payment of 2.04% is associated with  repayments of $193 (4.08% of the
balance) and $762 of interest charges. A third quartile minimum payment of 3.92% is
associated with a repayment of $570 (14.24% of the balance) and $197 of interest
charges. Generalizing the experiment to the same scenario predicts that including
minimum payment information roughly doubles interest charges: With minimum payment
information repayments of $909 (23% of the balance) lead to $109 of interest charges.
Without minimum payment information repayments of $1603 (40% of the balance) lead to
$49 of interest charges. Though the two estimates are different (one is based on altering
the minimum payment and the other on omitting the minimum payment), both suggest
anchoring on minimum payment information may be costly.
Warnings about the dangers of making only minimum payments (as discussed by
the UK Treasury Select Committee and the US Senate Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs) are likely to lead to disengagement rather than behavior adjustment (cf.
Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, 2006). Warnings about anchoring are ineffective in other
domains (Wilson, Houston, Etling, & Brekke, 1996) and may fail here. Understanding of
compound interest is poor (Lee & Hogarth, 1999), but manipulations that reduce
uncertainty also reduce anchoring (Mussweiler & Strack, 2000), so methods like
providing a table of alternative repayment scenarios should attenuate anchoring. 
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. The distribution of repayments in the hypothetical credit card bill experiment.
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